Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications

Faculty Scholarship

12-1993

Not Guilty by Reason of Victimization
Susan Rutberg
Golden Gate University School of Law, srutberg@ggu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
20 CACJ Forum 36 (Dec. 1993)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.

~

M

E

N

T

A

5

L

T

A

T

E

D

E

F

E

N

E S

(
I

Not Guilty by Reason of Victimization
by Susan Rutberg

If you put a dog in a cage, and keep
poking him with a stick, sooner or later
he's going to bite you.
-George JacKson, author of
Soledad Brothers: The Prison
Letters of George Jackson
On October 26, 1991, 17 -year-old
Felicia Morgan and two teenage friends
went on what the press termed a
"crimes of fashion" spree in downtown
Milwaukee. With guns in hand they
walked up to people on the street and
took clothes, jewelry, and shoes. When
17-year-old Brenda Adams tried to run
away rather than give up the new patchwork leather coat she'd gotten for her
birthday, Felicia Morgan shot her dead.
Felicia's lawyer, Milwaukee criminal
defense attorney Robin Shellow, put on
expert testimony to support a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) defense.
Shellow tried to convince the jury that
Felicia suffered from an urban combatinduced traumatic stress reaction,
resulting from her life-long exposure to
intrafamily and community violence.
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD}I
is a phenomenon named by psychiatrists to describe the physical and emotional behavior patterns of trauma

survivors: survivors of the kind of
trauma that is considered outside the
range of ordinary human experience.
When use of the term first became
popular in the late 1970s, it was most
commonly associated with Vietnam
veterans and their combat-induced behavioral disorders.2 The APA and the
psychiatric community have now recognized that PTSD also describes the behavior of people who have survived a
variety of other traumatic experiences.
and that there are links between traumatic victimization and subsequent
anti-social behavior.3
Events that may result in PTSD in
children include: exposure to violence
and/or sexual abuse (intra-family and/or
in the child's immediate community).
exposure to war. and the occurrence of
natural disasters (fires. floods. Three
Mile Island. etc.).' Sometimes PTSD is
triggered by one horrific event; sometimes by chronic abuse. Not every exposure to a traumatic event results in
PTSD. and not every person diagnosed
as suffering from PTSD exhibits all the
same symptoms.
Dr. James Garbarino. a Chicago specialist on the effects of violence on children and one of the expert witnesses in

See People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006
(re\'ersible error to exclude penalty phase
defense expert testimon~' re possibility that
Lucero suffered from PTSD as result of
service in Vietnam war). and People \'.
Bruhn (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1195 (Lucero
had served combat duty in Vietnam. Court
ordered case remanded for resentencing
directing trial court to consider federal
commitment for Lucero-per PC 1170.9and exercise discretion.)
J PTSD: DSM-IV AND BEYOND. supra; HERMAN.
1., TRAUMA AND RECOVERY, Basil' Books
(1992); Kaser-Boyd, N., Post-Trallllllltic

Felicia Morgan's case, describes cons.
tant exposure to a cui ture of violence as
akin to growing up in chronic combat. s
Whatever the type of trauma, PTSD
symptoms may include increased ago
gression, abnormally quick responses of
rage, and episodes in which the sufferer
acts without control while reliving a
traumatic experience. 6
Felicia Morgan was beaten and threa.
tened at gun and knife point by her
mother throughout her childhood. The
landlord raped her when she was 11.
Later she was molested by her mother's
boyfriend. Felicia often witnessed gun.
fights among family members, includ·
ing seeing her mother shoot at both her
father and the boyfriend. Two of her un·
cles were murdered two days apart.
Felicia was present at the violent deaths
of several other relatives and friends.
When a psychologist asked Felicia how
she had managed to stay alive, she said: (
"My ears be open, even when I'm
asleep."? Shellow described her client's
mental condition as a borderline per·
sonality disorder resulting from the
cumulative effects of the violence in her
life. According to Shellow, her client
wasn't crazy "because she lived in a bad
neighborhood, because she was poor, or
because she was black ... , she became
crazy in order to survive."B
The jury found Felicia Morgan guilty

l

2
I

PTSD has been formall~' recognized by the
American Psychiatric Association and listed
in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM) since 1980. The
DSM (the Bible of psychiatric diagnoses) is
currently being re\'ised for a fourth edition.
DSM-IV. As part of the process of revising
it. a sub-workgroup of APA members has recently published a book. Post Trallllllltic

Stress· Disorder: DSM-IV Alld 8ey()/ul.
American Psychiatric Press. Inc.; (Davidson
.lOd Foa, ed .. 1993). While this publication
does not present the official position of the
DSM-IV Task Force. which is responsible
fur revising the DSM. it gi\'es a good indication of the more inclusi\'e definition of
PTSD that will be included in DSM-IV.

36

Stress Disorders ill Childrell al/{I Adults: The
I,egal Rele\'(/Il('e (WESTERN STATES LAW
4

REVIEW, publication forthcoming).
PTSD: DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra at xi.

5

Dr. Garbarino contends that tens of thou'
sands of inner-city children probably suffer
not only from PTSD, but also frolll a loss of
faith i~ adults and in the future. Woo. 1.

Urball Trauma Mitigates Gllilt. Defei/ders
Sa\', The Wall Street 10urnal. 4/27/93.
• TH'E AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAl.
DISORDERS, 3rd Ed., Revised (DSM·!II·R)
1987.
7 Woo, supra. The Wall Street Journal.

4/27/93.
8

Flaherty, The Ghel/o MildI' Me Do II. I~
THESE TIMES at 19 (AprilS, 1993).
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of first degree murder. In the second
phase of the trial, the same jury rejected
her insanity defense-but in the end, the
judge, who had heard months of testimony about the horrors that made up
Felicia's life, sentenced her to the absolute minimum amount of prison time.
She will be parole eligible in 13 years. 9

Over representation of PTSD
Sufferers Among Criminal
Defendants
PTSD is now understood to be "a
problem of substantial magnitude in the
general population." According to a
1991 study, 4 out of to Americans have
experienced major trauma, and the disI order itself may be present in 9% of the
population. lo
Criminal defense lawyers have long
known intuitively that PTSD survivors
like Felicia Morgan are enormously
I overrepresented among our clients. For
I many of our clients, born and raised
I amid incredible violence, this prolonged
exposure (as victim and witness) may
result in the form of PTSD that Felicia
Morgan's lawyer described as "Urban
Psychosis."11
The publicity surrounding California's most recent executions has
brought similar horrifying life stories of
death row inmates to the front page of
lour collective consciousness, and has
", helped make the link between early vicj timization and later perpetrat;on painfully clear. The two men executed by the
: State within the last two years, Robert
j Alton Harris (the product of both Fetal
Moohol Syncleom'" and a viol,nt ,hild-

I
I

I

j

I

hood), and David Mason (beaten and humiliated as a child, violent and suicidal
as an adult), are both examples of
people who grew up to do unto others
some version of what was done to them
as children.
Recent studies of death row prisoners
indicate that, in addition to (or as a
result of) shared histories of child
abuse, many of the prisoners also suffer
from brain damage. The root cause of
the neurological damage may be Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome, or severe head injury, or both, but the results are similar:
scars in the parts of the brain that affect
judgment and the ability to control rage
and other emotions. Although certainly
not every victim becomes a perpetrator,
a brain-damaged child raised in an atmosphere of chronic violence is a likely
candidate for socially unacceptable behavior. 13
As criminal defense lawyers we are
privy to our clients' psycho-social histories in a way that others in the system
are not. We have a responsibility to
educate judges and juries about the relevance of traumatic events to the formation of specific in ten t, and to the
significance of PTSD as a factor in mitigation at sentencing. 14 We do much
more for our clients if we can bring this
information to light early on, as part of
our representation of first-time offenders. While the PTSD defense has been
employed almost exclusively in homicide cases, we must not hold this

I
I

! 'Telephone conversation with Robin

·
I

Shellow.
P!~D: DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra at xi, lx,
CIting
Breslau ct al. 1991).
1
11 Dr. Judith Herman has referred to this
more complex form of PTSD as Disorder of
Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specified
(DESNOS), which is currently under consideration for inclusion in DSM-IV. She
SUggests that prolonged and repeated exPosure to trauma causes pathological
changes in behavior and personality. PTSD:
DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra, Chapter 12.
; 12 Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) is defined as
I a chemical imbalance in the fetus caused
. by excessive drinking by the mother, and
affecting the central nervous system of the
developing fetus, manifest in a cluster of
10

I

t-' ·

Vol. 20, No.4

symptoms and subtle physical characteristics sometimes difficult to detect, including
difficulty in telling right from wrong and
understanding the consequences of behavior, and poor judgment.
According to the National Council on Alcoholism, an estimated 5,000 children-one
in every 750-are born each year with FAS.
JJ A study of 15 death row inmates, conducted
by Dorothy Otnow Lewis, a professor of
Psychiatry at New York University School
of Medicine, revealed that all 15 had evidence of severe head injury and 12 showed
evidence of neurological problems, ranging,
from blackouts to amnesia, as well. (Lori
Olszewski, New Theory About What Makes
a Murderer: Child Abuse Plus Brain Injuries, San Francisco Chronicle, 8/12/93 A-I,
A-12.)
14 In the case or Lyle and Erik Menendez, on
trial in Los Angeles at the time this article
is being written, the two brothers are ac-

Susan Rutberg, formerly a deputy public
defender in San Francisco, is now an Associate Professor at Golden Gate University
School of Law. She is a board member of
Women Defenders.

defense in reserve until a client's mental state has degenerated to the point
where they face the most serious crime.
This article is written to help defense
lawyers focus on this most critical
defense early enough in our clients' lives
to offer them real help.

cused of killing their parents. Defense lawyer Leslie Abramson tried to introduce evidence of the brothers' molestation and
abuse to support their claim of selfdefense. Initially, Superior Court Judge
Stanley Weisberg refused to let the jury
hear it, saying: "I think this whole issue is
being blown out of proportion ... that
somehow there's a linkage between the
molestation, if there was one, and the killings. It doesn't prove anything." Abramson's response is indicative of the gap in
the perspectives, the parallel universes inhabited by bench and bar on this issue: "It
does not surprise me to hear the court say
that. It horrifies me, but it doesn't surprise
me .... We can't get him (Judge Weisberg)
to broaden his view of what the evidence is
in this case, and I can't understand it." (Parents' Shooting, Family Secrets: Court
Weighs Whether Sex Abuse Bears on Sons'
GlIilt, San Francisco Examiner 8/22/93 B-6,
col.!.)
Eventually the defense succeeded in persuading the judge to admit evidence of the
defendants' childhood abuse.

37
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Effects of PTSD
The impact on most organisms that
live with long-term stress is biological
change and eventual breakdown. ls In
humans, acute or chronic stress produces both a biological response and an
emotional response. Psychiatrists believe that if the trauma (or stressor) is
significant enough to create the threat
of death, or the perception that the victim might die, the person's sense of
safety in the world may be unalterably
affected. Long after the traumatic event
is over, PTSD survivors live with an enhanced sense of threat as well as impaired impulse control, and difficulty in
controlling strong emotions. The mind
and body's struggle to recover from
trauma often produces a constriction of
the personality, a dampening down of
emotions, and an attempt to forget or
repress the traumatic memories. A
resurgence of all the original feelings
can and often does come with a stimulus, most likely in the form of a similar
event that triggers the repressed
memories and feelings produced by the
original event. 16
General conditions that seem to hold
true for people reacting to acute or
chronic traumatic stress include: protracted depression, avoidance of
thoughts or feelings associated with the
trauma, inability to recall important
aspects of .the trauma, feelings of
detachment or estrangement, sleep
problems, restlessness, withdrawal,
hyperstartle, hypervigilance, confusion,
paranoia, overwhelming fear, a restricted range of affect, and a sense of a
foreshortened futureP
Helping our clients unlock these
memories can provide support for
defenses to crimes or explanations in
mitigation of criminal behavior by ex-

SELYE, H., THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY
OF EXPOSURE TO STRESS (1950), Montreal:
ACTA, Inc.
16 Kaser-Boyd, N., Balash, S., Battered
15

Woman Syndrome and Other Subtypes of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Strengths
and Liabilities in the Courtroom 19 CACJ
17

FORUM 4 (1992).
PTSD: DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra, at 75.
Felicia Morgan's survival mechanism: "My
ears be wide open, even when I'm asleep,"
supra, is an example of the hypervigilance
common in PTSD survivors.

38

plaining how events surrounding the
charged crime triggered reliving the
original trauma.

When we want mental state
evidence admitted,
what do we argue?
1. Relevance: Raising a Reasonable

Doubt on Mental State
Due process requires that every criminal defendant be afforded the opportunity to have evidence of his/her state of
mind (also known as relevant mental
condition) placed before the jury. If this
kind of evidence is excluded, the right to
present an effective defense is imperiled. (Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973); Washington v. Texas,
388 U_S. 14 (1967).) The California Legislature purported to abolish the "diminished capacity" defense in 1981, yet
evidence of mental impairment and/or
intoxication may still be offered on the
issue of whether the defendant actually
formed a required specific intent, or
mental state. (Penal Code sections 22,
28.)'8
In fact, the Legislature may not deny
a defendant the opportunity to disprove
a requisite mental state. People v. Bobo
(1990) 229 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1442. A
defendant retains the 14th Amendment
due process right to present evidence
on, and have the jury determine, any

18

In 1978, former San Francisco Supervisor
Dan White shot and killed then-Mayor
George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey
Milk. The killings occurred in San Francisco City Hall during business hours, and
the defendant, a former San Francisco fireman and friend of many San Francisco
police officers, surrendered. The sympathetic police detectives conducting
White's post-surrender interrogation asked
him to "tell us about the pressures you've
been under lately .... " White's lawyers
offered psychiatric testimony focusing on
White's state of mind. The expert testified
about the effect of a super-junk food diet
on an already overstressed mind. This
"Twinkie" defense was ridiculed in the
press, but the jury found it persuasive.
White's later acquittal of murder (he was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter instead), resulted in mass demonstrations
and public outcry. The Legislature responded by trying to close the door on mental defenses falling somewhere short of
insanity. The new Penal Code sections
substituted "diminished actuality" for

issue which negates a mental element of
the charge. 19
Battered women have paved the Way
for the introduction of evidence of Past
mistreatment as a way to shed light on
the issue of intent in the charged crillle
Responding to articulate advocates fa;
battered women, the Legislature relaxed
the rules for admission of expert testimony on Battered Women's Syndrollle
(BWS).20 New Evidence Code section
1107, enacted in 1991, makes expert testimony on BWS generally admissible.21
Section (a) provides that "expert tes-
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"diminished capacity." Hence, since 1981
defense lawyers trying to bring in evidenc~
about their clients' mental state have had
to show that it is relevant to whether or not
their clients actually formed the requisite
intent.
19 See, Tom Lundy, Adventures in the Wonder- .
land of Specific Intent, 20 CACJ FORUM 2
(1993).
·t.
20 "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS) is a
term used to describe the behavioral patterns of women who have been the victims
of violence perpetrated by their partners,
and who have remained in the relationship
after repeated violent incidents. Offered to
explain how a woman's particular experiences affect her perceptions of danger
and her honest belief in its imminence, I)
BWS evidence has become increasingly accepted in the courts. The dynamic is generally described as a cycle of violence
involving three phases: tension building, an
acute battering incident, and a tranquil
period of (often) loving contrition. Some
victims of BWS exhibit a condition known
as "learned helplessness" which causes distorted behavior-passivity and compliance
rather than resistance or attempts to escape. Overwhelming fear that the batterer
will kill them (or their children) if they attempt to leave is another factor in the be·
havior of women who suffer from BWS.
For further information, see: WALKER, LENORE, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); TERRIFYING
LOVE (1989); Maguigan, Battered Women ,
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and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconcep·
tions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 379 (1991); Murphy, Assisting Ihe
Jury in Understanding Victimization: Expert Psychological Testimony on Bat/ered
Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma syndrome, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 277
(1992); Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and
Women: Heat of Passion Manslallghlerand
Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L.REV.
21

1679 (1986).
CACJ was instrumental in ensuring passage of the legislation amending Evidence
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is admissible by either the

I, prosecution
or the defense, regarding
battered women's syndrome, including
I the physical, emotional, or mental ef-

Iy

5t

i fects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or

'n

e.

behavior of victims of domestic violienee, except when offered against a
criminal defendant to prove the occurrenee of the act or acts of abuse which
form the basis of the criminal charge."
, section (b) of the new statute describes
1 the minimal foundation required: the
proponent must simply establish
relevancy and properly qualify the expert witness. The section goes on to
state: "Expert opinion testimony on battered women's syndrome shall not be
1 considered a new scientific technique
whose reliability is unproven."
Two recent battered women cases
1seem to indicate a judicial willingness to
make the link between past mistreatI ment and mental state that the judge in
11 the Menendez case found so difficult to
understand. In both, failure to investigate the possibility that a client
suffered from battered woman syndrome, and thus to offer the evidence at
trial, resulted in reversaL People v. Day
(1992) 2 CaLApp.4th 405; and People v.
Romero (1992) 15 Cal.AppAth 1519,
rev. granted - - Cal.4th - - , 17
. Cal.Rptr.2d 120.
In People v. Day, supra the Court
l found reversible error in defense coun1sel's failure to offer evidence of BWS to
'j'rebut the prosecutor's impeaching
cross-examination of the defendant. Day
1claimed self-defense: during crossexamination, the prosecutor raised the
inference that her conduct before and
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j 'C;;de section 1107. Former CAC) President
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Leslie Abramson helped draft it, and legis·
. . lative advocate Melissa Nappan lobbied for
, its passage.
A bill co-authored by State Senator
Killea and Assembly Member Moore,
J proposing a change in the definition of
voluntary manslaughter in domestic vio,
Ilence cases, came within one vote of pas.' sage in the Legislature this past session.
Senate Bill 1144 would have provided that
'Il the jury or court is entitled to infer an
honest but unreasonable belief in the
necessity to resort to selr·defense if the
defendant has both been subjected to a his·
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.1' tory or pattern of repeated abuse or domes·
~ic violence by the decedent, and was in an
Intimate relationship with the decedent.
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after the incident was inconsistent with
that defense_ "Had evidence of the BWS
been introduced, he (defense counsel) effectively could have countered the battered woman myths on which the
prosecutor built his case .... BWS evidence would have bolstered appellant's
credibility, and lent credence to her selfdefense claim." (Day, supra at 420).
An earlier case, predating the changes
to Evidence Code section 1107, opened
the door for the introduction of expert
testimony re BWS. People v. Aris (1989)
215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1196 held that such
expert testimony was admissible,
although for limited purposes, when
offered by the defendant to support a
claim that she assaulted or killed her
abusive husband in self-defense. The
court found that the proffered BWS evidence was not admissible to prove the
objective reasonableness of D's claimed
self-defense. However, it also held that
it was error (albeit harmless) to exclude
expert testimony regarding BWS, to the
extent defendant's particular experiences affected her perceptions of
danger and its imminence. 22
People v. Romero, supra, which was
not a domestic violence case per se, is
particularly noteworthy for defense
lawyers needing arguments to support
the notion that a client's history of
abuse is relevant to alleged criminal behavior. Debra and Terrance Romero
were jointly charged with robbery and
attempted robbery, and Debra's defense
was duress. Although her trial lawyer
recognized the possibility that Debra
Romero suffered from BWS and made
some inquiries about finding an expert
witness to conduct an evaluation, that is
as far as he went. The court found that
counsel's failure to investigate was
unreasonable. Even though Debra
Romero's case went to trial before the
Legislature added section 1107 to the

1
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22

Brenda Aris was granted clemency by
Governor Wilson on May 28, 1993. Prof.
Kathleen (Cookie) Ridolfi, Santa Clara
University Law School and the California
Coalition for Battered Women in Prison
represented Ms. Aris. See also, Ridolfi's
response to Governor Wilson's limited
grants of clemency: Governor Improperly
Restricted Use of Pardoning Power, CALIFORNIA STATE BAR BULLETIN, 7/28/93, at I.
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Evidence Code, the court still found it
would have been reasonable to expect a
criminal defense lawyer to recognize the
applicability of BWS evidence to a
duress defense. Romero, supra at 1162,
fn.11.
Romero makes clear that despite limitations on the scope of allowable mental
defenses, counsel still has the obligation
to undertake "careful factual and legal
investigations and inquiries with a view
to developing matters of defense in
order that he (sic) may make informed
decisions on his (sic) client's behalf ...
(citation omitted). If as a result of his
(sic) failure to undertake a careful inquiry and investigation a crucial defense is withdrawn from the case, the
defendant has not had the assistance of
counsel to which she is entitled." (People
v. Romero, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 1150,
1162, quoting People v. Shells (1971) 4
Ca1.3d 626, 630 and People v. Ibarra
(1963) 60 Cal.2d 460, 464.)
2. A Variety of Theories
When you are seeking admission of
expert testimony on some syndrome or
mental state other than battered woman
syndrome, you will still have to convince the judge of the nexus between
your client's story and the lack of the
requisite mental state. Traditionally, expert testimony is deemed relevant if it
will be of assistance to the jury in deciding the facts of the case. "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise" (Federal Rules of Evidence,
Rule 702) If the witness is qualified, and
the subject is "sufficiently beyond a
common experience" that hearing the
witness's testimony would assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue,
then the testimony should be admitted.
(Evidence Code sections 720, 801). The
California Supreme Court has "interpreted this language to require exclusion of expert opinion 'only when it
would add nothing at all to the jury's
common fund of information .... " (Peoplev. Stoll(1989)49Ca1.3d 1136, 1154,
quoting People v. McDonald (1984) 37
Ca1.3d 351,367.)
Outside the BWS context, in which
39
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the Legislature has specifically sanctioned admission of expert testimony,
defense counsel should consider a variety of theories for connecting the expert
testimony to the mental state in issue.
First, counsel might argue by analogy
to Evidence Code section 1107 that if the
defendant has been a victim of repeated
abuse, PTSD would be admissible to
show, in the vernacular of section 1107,
its "effects upon the beliefs, perceptions
or behavior of victims" of such violence.
The Legislature has acknowledged the
relevance of this expert testimony to
one class of defendant; there is no principled reason to restrict the evidence to
that group of defendants. 23
Second, defense counsel should consider employing established defenses
such as unconsciousness in the PTSD
context. See e.g., People v. Wu (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 614, a case in which a
mother was charged with the murder of
her child. Trial counsel introduced testimony showing that at the time of the
killing the mother's extreme emotional
and psychological distress brought on a
fugue state. The trial court refused a requested instruction on the defense of
unconsciousness. The Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the instruction. Predictably, Wu was depublished;

23

Defendants other than battered women
may be able to argue that Evidence Code
section 1107 permits them to introduce expert testimony like BWS. Section 1107 permits testimony regarding the effects of
BWS on "victims of domestic violence."
The statute defines "domestic violence" by
reference to section 542 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Domestic Violence Protection
Act). That section defines domestic violence
as abuse perpetrated against "any of the
following: (I) A spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, any other
adult person related by consanguinity or
affinity within the second degree, or a person with whom the respondent has had a
dating or engagement relationship. (2) A
person who is the parent of a child .... "
Moreover, defendants may have a claim
that limiting BWS-type mental evidence to
the class of battered women would deprive
other similarly situated defendants of the
equal protection of the laws. A cohabitant
should likewise be able to present expert
testimony to explain the effects of their
particular mental condition on criminal
intent.

40

but the authority upon which it relied
remains good law supporting a defense
of unconsciousness where the psychological forces acting on defendant are so
severe as to produce action without
awareness. See e.g., People v. Wilson
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 749; People v. Moore
(1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 486. See CAUIC No.
4.30.)24
Expert testimony negating the inference of a predisposition to commit the
charged crimes may be admissible as
character evidence. Refusal to permit
"Anti-Syndrome" evidence in a prosecution for lewd and lascivious acts against
a child may result in reversal. In People
v. Stoll, supra, child molestation convictions were reversed due to the trial
court's prejudicial exclusion of defendant's proffered evidence of psychologist's opinion that he showed no signs of
"deviance" or "abnormality." The court
held the evidence was relevant to the
defendant's claims that the charged acts
did not occur, the psychologist's qualifications were well established, and the
testimony would have been proper character evidence.

An approach to interviewing 25
Part of the problem in figuring out
how to get relevant mental state evidence admitted is overcoming clients'
resistance to talking about traumatic
events. Clients suffering from some
form of PTSD are unable to tell you so
directly. Their symptoms (denial,
depression, substance abuse, etc.) are
almost all impediments to easy disclosure. What survivors of PTSD cannot
help doing, however, is reveal clues to
their histories in their interactions with
you. An awareness of the behavior pat-

PTSD may also be relevant to the tradi·
tional defense of heat of passion, to the extent that the defendant's "passion" may be
the product of having been the victim of
persistent violence. (See People v. Borchers
(1958) 50 Cal.2d 321 [passion may be rage,
anger or any other intense emotion].)
25 Many of the suggestions below are the
product of a telephone conversation on
June 10, 1993 with psychologist Kathleen
Wayland, Duke Medical Center, Dept. of
Psychiatry, Durham, North Carolina. Dr.
Wayland's work concentrates on traumatized children and their resultant conduct
disorders.
24

terns that characterize a PTSD surviVor
will make it easier for you to recognize
such clients and respond appropriately.
Some suggestions borrowed from ther_
apists to encourage reluctant patients to
talk about their histories are:
1. To make it easier to build trust
identify one person in the defense tea~
to play the mental health role-to be the
client's confidante regarding psychosocial issues. If you have the resources
use an experienced psychologist. If not'
consult with one, read what you can'
and pay attention to the client's re:
sponses.
2. Ask open-ended questions. Listen
to the client's responses and watch how )
s(he) interacts with you. Be careful not I.
to talk in psychobabble or lawyer-speak.
Don't label the phenomenon you think
might be present (i.e. "Are you a bat. ,
tered woman? Was your father an alcoholic?") Try instead to move people to r
tell their stories in their own ways: "Can [
you think of a time when your father
was angry? Tell me about that time."
Ask for more and more detail, as con·
crete as possible, until you think that
memory is exhausted. Come back to it ['
later.
We know this technique already: we
learned it the hard way during our first l'.
few weeks of practice. "Okay, now tell
me this," you asked in your most law·
yerly way, "Did you give a statement to
the police?" "No way," says the client,
you think I'm stupid?" But when you
get discovery from the DA, there's a
detailed, 1O-page, tape-recorded confes·
sion! That's how we knew to ask it
differently: "Okay, I want to hear every·
thing you can remember about getting
arrested, from the time the cop first
came up until he left you in the jail
cell ... and "Then what happened?
What did the cop first say to you? And
what did you tell him? ... and did yOU
ever see him write anything down? Any·
body else around? What else did he say?
What else did you say to him?"
a
3. Take it slow. Be gentle. Explain the
s
concept of confidentiality in easily un'
d
derstandable ways. Tell the client why
a
you are asking all these prying ques·
g
tions. E.g.,: "This is important to me be'
A
cause it's part of who you are, and
because this information may give us a P
0;
way to help get you out of this situa'
tion." Communicate with the client ) "J
often: keep him/her informed about the
tl
process you are going through.
tc
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4. Once there has been a first mention of some traumatic event or pattern
of behavior (physical or sexual abuse,
combat, whatever) then respond supporI tively and tread lightly. Remember that

I
I

for trauma survivors to describe the
event is sometimes to relive the trauma.
Lawyers are not therapists. Try to get
the court to pay for the services of a
I therapist and/or look for one who is
, willing to treat your client pro bono.
I 5. Be careful not to relate to your
client as a victim, so as not to reinforce
the negative self-image that often is a
byproduct of abusive treatment. SurvivI ing an attempt at dehumanization is a
testament to the individual's ability to
I develop extreme coping mechanisms.
Being able to talk about a trauma is an
initial stage of recovery. Therapists call
it naming or claiming and believe it
helps the person overcome repeated
: reliving of the trauma.
6. Investigate your client's background. Locate all the documents you
can find: school records; hospital and
psychiatric records of client and parJ ents; parents' criminal records; police
reports of domestic violence or sexual
abuse in the client's home.
Any corroboration of your client's
story serves a dual purpose: it makes
your defense more real to the court,
thus increasing your chances of getting
1itto the jury, and it provides emotional
j support for the client. When you go to
gre~t lengths to find evidence to ~ack.up
; ac!lent's story, you are commumcatmg
I akind of faith that may help give the
client the courage to testify.
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jlf We lose admissibility arguments,

1how do we respond? Imagine the
judge has the nerve to deny a
, carefully crafted and brilliantly
)
argued motion and offer
j
of proof ...
I

! 1. Try again: see if the court will
i a!low a compromise. Request permisI Sion for the expert to testify about the
defendant's mental condition and about
any relevant syndromes, such as PTSD
1
,generally, or Battered Woman or
I~bused Child syndrome specifically.
: fomise to refrain from asking for an
,
~Pinion that the alleged crime was a
Product" of the mental condition in
. this case. Offer an instruction tailored
, to the facts of your case and the state of

I
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the law: that "a defendant is not responsible if at the time of his (sic) unlawful
conduct his (sic) mental or emotional
processes or behavior controls were impaired to such an extent that he (sic)
cannot justly be held responsible for his
(sic) act." United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969, 986 (D.C. Cir.1972 Bazelon,
c.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See also CALJIC 9.35.1 (1992)
cautionary instruction on BWS.
Offer another instruction to your expert defining the limitations of her role:
"As an expert witness, you may, if you
wish, and if you feel you can, give your
opinion about whether the defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect. You may then explain how defendant's disease or defect relates to his
alleged offense, that is, how the development, adaptation and functioning of
defendant's behavioral processes may
have influenced his conduct. This explanation should be so complete that the
jury will have a basis for an informed
judgment on whether the alleged crime
was a 'product' of his mental disease or
defect. But it will not be necessary for
you to express an opinion on whether
the alleged crime was a 'product' of a
mental disease or defect, and you will
not be asked to do so .... " (See Judge
Bazelon's model instruction in Washington v. U.S. 390 F.2d 444, 457-58 (D.C. Cir.
1967);
2. Prepare your client to testify: No
matter how impressive your expert,
your client's direct testimony is probably the best way to communicate
hislher mental state at the time of the alleged crime in the context of hislher life
story. Working with the client to help
himlher understand the relationship between the traumatic events and hislher
present circumstances may make it easier for your client to communicate.
Your ongoing conversations with your
client, particularly if supplemented by
therapy, will affect your client's comfort
level-eliminating some of the flataffect, detached quality that creates
credibility problems for a client who
suffers from PTSD.26
3. Become the excluded expert in
closing argument: Consult with people
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knowledgeable in the particular syndrome. Read whatever you can find.
Think about factual illustrations, generalizations, studies you can use that connect your client's story to a universally
understandable story. Think about
Robert Alton Harris, David Mason and
Felicia Morgan.

Why Courts Resist Linking a
Defendant's Background to
Specific Intent
Legal Fictions
The criminal justice system functions

more effective witness without therapy. A
client who chooses not to undergo therapy
may appear detached and unemotive on the
witness stand. Some BWS specialists believe that there is an advantage to having
the client appear before the jury in this untreated state. Rather than forcing therapy
on an unwilling client, these specialists
prefer to offer expert testimony to explain
the connection between their client's
trauma and her flat affect.

AUl'()IVIA'fIC

CR()SS EXAlVIINATI()N
hy /)([l'id R. Reed
Dramatically improve yourcross-examination technique overnight! This revolutionary system not only reveals the seventeen secrets of great cross-examination but translates common courtroom
situations into easy-to-remember acronyms you'll use forever. Each acronym
is thorough and designed for dramatic
impact. Never be lost with any witness.
Now, simply apply an acronym and automatically destroy informants, identity
witnesses, detectives ... almost any type
of witness to win cases. This book is the
only guide you'll ever need on crossexamination and a 'must' to become a
great trial lawyer... ON SALE NOW!
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There are differing opinions among lawyers who specialize in defense of battered
women as to whether the client makes a
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on the basis of some fundamental principles, strongly espoused, but often
honored in the breach. These legal fictions include the presumption of innocence: a cornerstone of due process that
is widely proclaimed, but, inside the
courthouse, almost universally disbelieved. Though jurors are still instructed to presume a defendant not
guilty, the judge and prosecutor often
convey the opposite meaning by their attitude toward the defendant. Cynicism
is contagious: it is not hard for an observer to pick up on the fact that most
participants in the system presume the
defendant guilty (at least) as charged.
Prosecutors often see their job as simply proving the facts. Although most
crimes require a union of act and intent,
intent is generally presumed from the
(often grisly) facts themselves. Defense
efforts to focus the court's attention on
the defendant's background and its effect on his/her intent to commit the
crime are discouraged. For many trial
judges, the only issue is "dig (s)he do it,
or didn't (s)he?" and, since we know
s(he) did, "let's get on to sentencing."
Institutional resistance to letting juries hear defendants' true-life horror
stories is easy to understand: the criminal law is based on two of the biggest
legal fictions of all: that criminals are
Evil, and that punishment works to
deter them from future crimes. 27 Traditional theories of crime and punishment
teach us that criminals are people exhibiting an innate "vicious will" who,
when confronted with the choice between right and wrong, choose freely to
do wrong. 28 But those of us who
represent criminal defendants have a
different point of view: as in Felicia
Morgan's case, "choice" is rarely the
word that accurately describes our
clients' relationship to their actions.
The criminal justice system has been
slow to legitimize the connection between enormously traumatic life events
or chronic abuse and violent crime because the system is not equipped to handle it. Evidence that many "criminals"
are bruised and abused people acting
out the destinies their families and communities have shaped for them is too

This article only addresses the first of these
two fictions.
28 Pound, Roscoe, Introduction to F. SAYRE,
CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW at xxxvi (1927).
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threatening to the status quo.
A defendant's psychosocial history is
relevant to the ability to form criminal
intent. Judges and juries need to he~r
the facts of the case in the context of the
larger story, the whole story: "What was
going on here? Who is this person?
What were his/her options?"
If we acknowledge the role physical.
sexual and emotional abuse has in the
shaping of the psyche, we will have to
replace our prisons with community
centers that provide childcare, health
care, shelter, substance abuse treatment,
parenting classes and job training. We
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will have to start by protecting OUr
children.
It is our job to try to bring evidence
about the forces present in our clients'
mental and physical lives into the COUrt.
room, to fight the court's cynicism, and
to tell each client's individual story. We
need to uncover these stories sooner
rather than later: if we can bring this
kind of evidence into the courtroom at
an early stage in a person's antisocial
development, then we create the possi.
bility of intervention, and some of these
same clients may not end up on Death
Row. 0
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1993 CACJ/CPDA
Death Penalty Defense Seminar Syllabus
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Sold only to defense teams!
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Did you miss the 1993 CACJ/CPDA Death Penalty Defense Seminar? You
can still benefit from the written materials by ordering the Seminar Syllabus.
Edited by Gregory Paraskou of the Santa Clara Public Defender Office, this
90S-page syllabus is a treasure trove of late-breaking scientific and legal
developments that no capital lawyer should be without! Includes:
DNA Selective Bibliography. William C. Thompson
Brain Imaging Techniques. John Wicks. Ph.D.
Controlling the Runaway Witness, Larry Pozner & Roger Dodd
Defending in an Age of Reciprocal Discovery, Charles Sevilla
Glossary of lAC Decisions, Clive Stafford Smith
Whose Case Is It. Anyway? Stuart R. Rappaport
Suggestions for Preparing Victim Impact Testimony,John Cotsirilos ,
Christie Warren
Facing the Future, Millard Farmer
Checklist for Handling Capital Cases, James McWilliams, Greg Paraskou,
Christie Warren
References on Mitigation Issues, Stephen Pittel, Ph.D.
Accomplices & Snitches, Clive Stafford Smith
Coping Responses to Psychosocial Stressors Among Mexican & Central
American Immigrants. Amado Padillo, Richard Cervantes, Margarita
Maldonado, Rosa Garcia
... and much, much more!
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Members: $40.89; nonmembers: $51.71.

To order, caU CAC} at (310) 204·0502.
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